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## From War to War: *Lord of the Flies* as the Sociology of Spite

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Bülent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen\*

A reading of Golding's *Lord of the Flies* as an allegory of a biopolitical or postpolitical society that elevates "security" to the most sacred principle of organization as a permanent state of exception and attempts to combine it with consumerism. It is in this context that spite, an impotent and self-sacrificial violence, reemerges as a postpolitical strategy. **KEYWORDS:** spite; security; exception; postpolitical; political infantilization

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The Lord of the Flies is expanding his Reich.  
All treasures, all blessings are swelling his might. . . .  
Down, down with the handful who doubt him!

—Stefan George, 1907

The film *Lord of the Flies*, based on William Golding's novel of the same title,<sup>1</sup> is a dystopic comment on war. For Golding, as for his contemporaries such as Adorno and Horkheimer, war was more than just a dark spot, an exception, in the history of civilization. The life of a group of boys on a desert island, depicted in the film with ruthless precision, does not illustrate a case of regress to pre-social forms but rather an ever-present possibility of our system, a state of exception. Indeed, in stark contrast to the standard interpretations, the two clans that the boys establish on the island, led by Ralph and Jack respectively, explicate the two sides of the same social bond. The upside consists of the image of society as rule-governed and institutionalized, the citizens being law-abiding; on the downside, we encounter fantasies of transgression, potlatch, and perversion: democratic utopianism versus fascist violence, society versus the mob. The two topologies coexist, and thus it would be a mistake to see one of them as being closer to nature, more

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true or more revealing than the other, which is also why there is always a fragile balance between the two topologies.

It is this fragility, the split character of authority, that *Lord of the Flies* dramatizes. Ralph continually appeals to reason and order, while Jack empowers his discursive position through references to an enemy, the “monster” on the hill. Ralph’s mistake, and the shortcoming of democracy in general, is his denial of what Bataille called “heterogeneity”: the importance of expenditure, play, war, and disorganization in social life. What Jack, on the other hand, can neither predict nor perceive is that his disorganizing lines of flight potentially can turn into an orgy of violence and, ultimately, a spiteful death.

### Play

The film opens with an accident: A plane evacuating military students from England during World War II crashes in the Pacific Ocean. The only survivors, a group of boys aged from five to thirteen, end up on a tropical desert island, where they are determined quickly to reestablish civilization. Indeed, in this respect the story brings to mind *Robinson Crusoe*, where the world is recreated on a desert island. Thus, as soon as two of the central figures in the film, Ralph and Piggy, meet each other, they try to find the other boys and start reestablishing the social order. An important object in this context is a conch shell they find on the beach. Functioning as a symbol of civilization (its sound being used as a call for gatherings of the castaways), the conch holds the boys together: the one who holds the conch has the right to speak, et cetera. In a sense, therefore, the conch is an instrument of democratic governance and legitimacy, a token necessary for preserving the agora and holding violence at bay. At this stage, even Jack, the figure who represents the antidemocratic tendency in the film, is content, when he loses the leadership election to Ralph, with remaining the leader of his own pack, the “hunters.” As a whole, he is uneasy with the thought of violence; thus, when he finds a pig caught in a tangle of vines in the jungle, he hesitates, together with the other boys, unable to kill the pig. The boys watch the pig free itself and run away. However, the similarity with Robinson’s island ends here. Because in *Robinson Crusoe*

[e]verything is taken from the ship. Nothing is invented. It is all painstakingly applied on the island. Time is nothing but the time necessary for capital to produce a benefit as the outcome of work. And the providential function of God is to guarantee a return.

God knows his people, the hardworking honest type, by their beautiful properties, and the evil doers, by their poorly maintained, shabby property. Robinson's companion is not Eve, but Friday, docile towards work, happy to be a slave, and too easily disgusted by cannibalism. Any healthy reader would dream of seeing him eat Robinson.<sup>2</sup>

In a sense, this anti-Puritan dream is realized in *Lord of the Flies*, in which invention and creativity are abundant, "work ethic" does not work, God too easily abandons its subjects, and evil thrives in the boys' increasing fear. Thus, things change quite early in the film: The boys start to drift away from order/civilization; and toward the end of the film, as the group moves further and further away from civilization, even the conch loses its attraction and is crushed by one of the boys, Roger, the sadist who also kills Piggy, the "inventor" of the conch.

It all starts when the boys find out that they are alone. They think their life on the island will be like in a comic book, a life without adults: "until the grown-ups come to fetch us we'll have fun."<sup>3</sup> The disappearance of authority figures and the prospect of fun, however, also bring with them fear, for the boys are scared of the possibility of long-term abandonment on the island, a fear that is to be reinforced later by the "monster." In fear, the boys expect to be rescued and, helped by Piggy's intelligence, they decide to build a signal fire to attract the attention of passing ships. This fire, one of the most significant metaphors in the film, signifies a bond with, a desire for (returning to) civilization: As long as the fire is alive, the boys can retain the hope of escape. However, from the very start, the fire turns out to be a double-edged sword. Thus the first fire the boys make runs out of control and a tree is set on flames. What promises escape can bring with it destruction. As the boys get more and more violent in the scenes that follow, they completely lose interest in the signal fire. Their process of disconnection from civilization reaches completion when the fire finally burns out. At this stage, the boys return to the state of nature.

Initially, the fire accidentally burns out because of the search for "fun." For their collective survival, everybody in the group must work. There are many things to be done: building huts, finding fruits to eat, securing the well-being of the smaller boys so that they stop having nightmares, and so on. Ralph is keen on division of labor. But Jack and his group are using hunting as an excuse to escape from real work. As Ralph and Jack grow increasingly hostile toward each other, the thematic conflict of the film (civilization versus violence, building huts versus hunting, territorialization versus deterritorialization) is articulated in the form of verbal argu-

ments. Ralph defends the common good; Jack is obsessed with power. Concomitantly, Ralph's group is held together with reference to reason, Jack's in identification with a charismatic leader. At this stage, however, Jack still has to justify hunting partly with reference to the common good: "the boys want meat." As a whole, life has a normalcy to it: The boys live according to a daily rhythm: mornings are play time; in the tropic afternoons they sleep; in the evenings they tell each other horror stories about the "beast"; they eat fruits, suffer diarrhea, and so on. There are, though, some signs of violence and perversion of this normalcy. Thus, we see that the bigger boys bully the others. But such violence primarily works against the background of a normality, as an exception that proves the rule.

One day, unexpectedly, Ralph and Piggy see a ship on the horizon. Precisely at the same moment, they realize that the signal fire has gone out. And it turns out that on that particular day, the signal fire should have been the hunters' responsibility. Ralph and Piggy are enraged with Jack. Jack and his boys, however, are increasingly obsessed with hunting and are totally unaware of the ship. Ralph and Piggy find them on their way back from the jungle, covered with blood and carrying a killed pig. Significantly in this context, killing the first pig is Jack's first taste of sovereignty, the power to decide on life and death: "a knowledge that they had outwitted a living thing, imposed their will upon it, taken away its life like a long, satisfying drink."<sup>4</sup> It is at this point that we get the first real confrontation between Ralph and Jack and the first signs of serious violence breaking out: "Ralph made a step forward and Jack smacked Piggy's head. Piggy's glasses flew off and tinkled on the rocks. Piggy cried in terror: 'My specs!'"<sup>5</sup> Excited with bloodlust, Jack and his boys ignore Ralph's and Piggy's criticism. In this scene, for the first time Jack explicitly denies Piggy the right to speak and refuses to apologize to him for breaking his glasses. In the following scene, Jack's hunters make a fire to roast the pig and start to dance in a frenzied ritual, reenacting the savagery of the hunt: "Kill the pig. Cut her throat. Spill her blood."<sup>6</sup>

It is significant that in the beginning of the film—that is, under more "normal" circumstances—none of the boys represents order more than Jack. He is the leader of a small boys' choir whose members readily sing and march on his command. Now, however, in the exceptional state emerging, he becomes the primary source of disorder. Step by step, the decivilizing process takes over. The boys' choir turns into a hunting pack. Thus we witness increasing nakedness, escalating bullying and rudeness among the boys, and a visible lack of hygiene and other signs of deterioration in their daily conduct. And in this context "fun" plays a decisive role. Now, in contrast to

Ralph's and Piggy's adult-like tone, most boys do not (want to) "act properly" any longer. "Fun" becomes a game without rules, increasingly including sadistic bullying and violence, especially of the most helpless victims—that is, the smallest boys.

After missing the chance of rescue, Ralph calls a meeting and attempts at seriousness: "This meeting must not be fun, but business."<sup>7</sup> But it is too late, and we quickly realize that "fun" already has become the rule, perversion a law. Precisely at this point, the boys start to behave like a crowd, ruled and manipulated by Jack, without any perspective of their own. "Like kids! They are acting like a crowd of kids!"<sup>8</sup> "Fun" transforms the desert island into a biopolitical space in which the boys can exercise unlimited violence on one another without the fear of punishment. The significance of post-oedipal violence and the unlimited, carnivalesque enjoyment depicted in the film lies in this transformation. The resulting social condition closely resembles Georges Bataille's "festival," a state of exception in which sacrifice, lawful crime, and sovereignty emerge in a pure form.<sup>9</sup> Festival is, more than anything else, a kind of potlatch, an opportunity to become naked—that is, to get rid of one's markers of identity or "civilized" manners. In nakedness, bodies "open out to a state of continuity through secret channels that give us a feeling of obscenity."<sup>10</sup> In the festival-crowd, that is, one can escape the "feeling of obscenity" and can embrace others without fear of touching.<sup>11</sup>

One of Bataille's examples is from the Hawaiian islands, where the death of the king meant a period in which all prohibitions were lifted: "No sooner is the event announced than men rush in from all quarters, killing everything in front of them, raping and pillaging to beat the devil."<sup>12</sup> As such, the festival does not threaten the established power; rather, it performs a reactionary state of exception. In other words, the festival is an attempt to strengthen and legitimize the grip of the game rather than changing its rules. Hence the "festival of the king's death" is authorized by the law itself through a regular self-suspension.<sup>13</sup>

Likewise, in *Lord of the Flies* this state of exception is imagined, by Ralph, like a festival limited in time and space; only "until the grown-ups come to fetch us we'll have fun." As such, as an exceptional, temporary, condition, the festival signifies a transgression that does not suppress but suspends the rule.<sup>14</sup> Transgression completes the rule by transcending it.<sup>15</sup> However, with Jack, who is keen on pointing out that their rescue is not probable—"there are 8 million islands, they will never find us"—the festival becomes permanent, marking the birth of a paradoxical order based on transgression. And not surprisingly, at a later stage in the film, the desert island (the space of exception) becomes a (permanent) home: "We like it here. We love

it here. We finally found a home. A home away from home.” This paradoxical “home,” a permanent space of exception, is what Agamben has called “camp,” the space in which order and disorder, inside and outside, politics and biopolitics, or, in short, between exception and the rule, become indiscernible.<sup>16</sup> Thus the biopolitical element is explicit in the film; through accelerating violence, the boys transform into stripped off, naked bodies, “animals.” However,

we should not be misled by the appearance of a return by man to nature. It is such a return, no doubt, but only in one sense. . . . [W]hen men, in the course of the festival, give free play to the impulses they refuse in profane times, these impulses have a meaning in the context of the human world: they are meaningful only in that context. In any case, these impulses cannot be mistaken for those of animals.<sup>17</sup>

So how can we interpret this strange desire acted out by the boys in *Lord of the Flies*? How can “becoming animal” be understood if it is always mediated by human “law”? The boys are under the influence of two simultaneous emotions; they are both fascinated and terrified by nature. “Taboo and transgression reflect these two contradictory urges. The taboo would forbid the transgression but the fascination compels it.”<sup>18</sup> Indeed, this strange double economy of desire and disgust, of object and abject, or of transgression and confirmation, is the underlying matrix of *Lord of the Flies*. It is by oscillating between the two poles that the boys become “animals.” Their formation of a crowd is crucial in this context.

### The Crowd

An “organized crowd,” writes Gustave Le Bon,<sup>19</sup> presents “new characteristics very different from those of the individuals composing it.” In the crowd, all sentiments and thoughts “take one and the same direction”; conscious personalities disappear. The subject in a crowd is always in a state of “expectant attention,” which makes it open to “suggestibility”; once in a crowd, the individual starts to obey all the suggestions of the “operator” (the leader) and can act in contradiction with his individual character.<sup>20</sup> In this sense *Lord of the Flies* depicts a perfect example of a crowd formation as the fear of the beast first emerges in the form of a suggestion and gradually becomes the main preoccupation of the boys. Indeed, *Lord of the Flies* is the allegory of a society in fear, a society that perceives security as its primary factor of organization.

Relatively early in the film, when Jack tells the group frightening stories for entertainment, some of the boys, especially the lit-



the ones, get scared. Jack takes pleasure in their naivety, whereas Ralph tries to calm them down. The group in general tries to ward off fear and seems to be aware of its destructive potential. "What we need here is positive people. Not people trying to scare people!" However, the very suggestion of a beast turns out to be contagious, and the fear it causes develops like a virus, terrifying the already fearful crowd and, ultimately, plunging it toward chaos.

Interestingly in this context, even though he knows that the "beast" does not exist, at one point Jack claims that *if* there is a beast, his hunters will kill it. On the basis of a suggestion, he starts to use the group's insecurity to consolidate his own position. Conscious of this, Ralph desperately tries to convince the group that the beast does not exist: "We've got to talk about this fear and decide there's nothing in it."<sup>21</sup> However, Ralph's call for reason is neglected. Later on, as the fear of the beast proves to be more and more useful, Jack openly claims that the beast exists. And the more fearful the "crowd" becomes, the more they listen to Jack; the more they listen to Jack, the more fearful they become. There emerges a perfect alliance between the suggestion and Jack's commands. The rest of the film is a story of how fear, cynically amplified by leaders, drives a crowd into a state of terror.

In *Lord of the Flies*, the search for security fuelled by increasing fear, brings with it only more violence and thus more fear. Manipulating their fear, Jack can easily make the boys act as a crowd. The belief in the beast quickly turns antithetical to democracy. The more the beast gains reality, the more the conch loses its meaning. Growing certainty about the beast translates into growing uncertainty for Ralph and Piggy. Jack problematizes Ralph's leadership. Ralph is not, though, *voted* down from power; instead, Jack angrily leaves the group, saying that anyone who would like to join him is welcome. Ralph is left frustrated and, together with Piggy, he tries to convince the "crowd" to remake the signal fire. But the other boys start to leave his group to join Jack's, also tempted by the pigs' meat.

In short, the struggle on "deciding on the fear" ends with Jack's sovereignty, with his definition of what the enemy is: For Ralph it is disorder, for Jack the monster. When the balance of power between Ralph and Jack radically shifts, Jack pushes Ralph and Piggy to the margins. A growing number of boys, virtually everybody except Ralph, Piggy, and Simon, no longer want to be bothered with rules. As the beast increasingly enables the breakdown of morality, order, and civilization, the lack of rule becomes the only rule. Even Ralph is exposed to manipulation and forced to act irrationally to be able to maintain his symbolic position, which is why he starts to join hunting sessions.



On a “beast hunting” session, the boys find pig droppings and decide to hunt the pig instead of looking for the beast. The pig escapes, yet the boys remain in frenzy. The same afternoon the “hunting pack” transforms itself into an “increase pack,” characterized by the “desire to be more,”<sup>22</sup> a desire that can be transferred to everything around a crowd, including animals. Thus, in a thoroughly ritualistic manner, the boys reenact the hunt among themselves, with one of the boys (Robert) playing the pig. A communion emerges in this very transformation of the hunting pack into the increase pack.<sup>23</sup> The boys jab the pig/boy with their spears while they dance and chant. At one point, however, the game turns real, and they start to beat Robert, almost killing him. Frightened to death, Robert suggests they use a real pig next time: “You want a real pig,” said Robert, still caressing his rump, “because you’ve got to kill him.” Exactly at this point, and it is a significant detail in the book omitted in the film, Jack suggests using one of the small boys instead. “And everybody laughed.”<sup>24</sup> The crowd cheers this idea of abandonment from the communion.

Later, after Jack gathers his own tribe and declares himself chief, his hunters manage to kill a sow, and in a scene that is visibly sexualized, one of the boys (Roger) drives his spear into the anus of the sow. The boys leave the sow’s head on the spear as a sacrifice to the beast. In this way, the pig becomes the boys’ “totem animal, that is, a substitute for the father.”<sup>25</sup> The flies are fast attracted to the rotting head, their Lord, which is an allegory for the dissolution of civilization. Jack being the lord of the flies, the crowd (of the boys) represents the flies. Flies are, indeed, as Elias Canetti suggests, archetypal symbols of the crowd.<sup>26</sup>

Killing and yet mourning their totem animal, the boys are filled with contradictory, neurotic feelings: On the one hand, they hate the beast (their primordial father) because it is an obstacle to their freedom, power, and sexual desires; yet, on the other hand, they admire and love the Lord of the Flies.<sup>27</sup> As such the totem becomes the source of the sociosymbolic order. And significantly, the beast/Lord orders enjoyment: “We are going to have fun on this island. Understand? We are going to have fun on this island!”<sup>28</sup> Indeed, the film illuminates how the demise of authority, or of the law, can lead to even more repressive authority structures based on superego figures supported by imaginary ideals/fears. What is characteristic of the superego, represented in the film by the Lord of the Flies, is that it does not want obedience, but commands fun. It wants, in other words, to turn transgression into a law, the exception into a norm.

Significantly in this context, the social order in *Lord of the Flies* is founded on envy. The “election scene” in the beginning of the film,

for instance, where Ralph wins although Jack is the oldest in the group, is illustrative. Even though Ralph says “it doesn’t matter who is in charge,” it matters to Jack, who envies Ralph’s power, Piggy’s intelligence, and above all their relationship, which explains the homoerotic triangle thus formed between the three boys. Piggy’s role is central: He is both an abject—hence has no name—and, at the same time, a femininized figure, an object of desire. The two categories, the object and abject, completely overlap in him, and this coincidence is what explains Jack’s envy/hate. Thus Jack envies—that is, “demands justice”:

[T]he demand for justice is thus ultimately the demand that the excessive enjoyment of the Other should be curtailed, so that everyone’s access to *jouissance* should be equal. The necessary outcome of this demand, of course, is asceticism: since it is not possible to impose equal *jouissance*, what one can impose is only the equally shared *prohibition*. However, one should not forget that today, in our allegedly permissive society, this asceticism assumes precisely the form of its opposite, of the *generalized* super-ego injunction “Enjoy!”<sup>29</sup>

It is no wonder that it is precisely when the promise of enjoyment—the lack of adults—turns into enjoyment as an imperative that the initial state of exception is normalized and democracy is degenerated into the delirium of a lynching mob. Thus, in the frenzy of a wild hunting dance (during which Ralph and Piggy also get excited), while the boys dance and chant—“Kill the pig. Cut her throat. Spill her blood”—they notice the shadowy figure of Simon creeping up from the forest and mistake him for the beast. They attack him and violently tear him apart. Ironically, the reason for Simon’s coming was to say that the beast does not exist; it was a dead parachutist—a “sign . . . from the world of grown-ups.”<sup>30</sup> With the death of the scapegoat, Simon, Jack attains full sovereignty, and he starts to use it arbitrarily.

Indeed, in *Lord of the Flies* the scapegoat and the sovereign emerge as two symmetrical figures. As a target of irrational violence, the scapegoat is excluded from norms and rules and is killed with impunity. Lynching is an exercise of sovereignty by the many over a single individual. And herein lies the significance of the scapegoat. The scapegoat can do something that no object of desire can do: Hatred toward him is not possessed individually, but is shared. In a crowd, people can mimic one another’s hatred, which is also what culminates in violence. Through the mimesis of hatred, the problem of conflict and difference is pushed aside, the group is united, and order is established. Indeed, the scapegoat is lynched “to protect the entire community from *its own* violence,” from disintegra-

tion.<sup>31</sup> In this sense scapegoating is the foundation of society. As with Hobbes's state of nature, René Girard's origin of culture is characterized by envy and enmity. Whereas the conflict is overcome in Hobbes by the creation of a well-ordered state, Leviathan, in Girard a lynching mob does the job. Further, there seems to be an intimate link between scapegoating (that is, the "lynch law") and Schmitt's state of exception:

There remains to this day one unashamedly primitive pack—the pack which operates under the name of *lynch law*. The word is as shameless as the thing, for what actually happens is the negation of the law. The victim is not thought worthy of it; he perishes like an animal, with none of the forms usual amongst men.<sup>32</sup>

Both the lynch law and the state of exception emerge as unlaw within the domain of law itself. In both, the "form of life" is reduced to the biopolitics of bare life.<sup>33</sup> In both, the relation between exception and rule is at the forefront, and the decision (to identify the scapegoat/enemy) is the basis of society. Just as the sovereign exception is the core of law, the scapegoat is what holds culture together.<sup>34</sup> At this stage, torture is normalized. Thus, in a violent scene, we see one of the boys tied up and beaten. It is also in tune with the emergence of this context that Jack wages a war against the evil and demonizes Ralph's group, which is reminiscent not only of the Cold War paranoia but also of the contemporary "war against terror."

Social theory has traditionally assumed that society is the norm and has conceptualized the crowd as an exception or deviation from the society. But contemporary sociality seems to be formed today in the image of the crowd. In a sense, the exception has become the rule. What we are witnessing is the loss of distinctive modern categories such as society and individual and the emergence of a crowd, a "much less distinct mass."<sup>35</sup> The individual and society were the two versions of the modern subject; what replaces them now is the crowd. However, becoming a crowd is an open-ended process. It can potentially remain a rhizomatic phenomenon, an intermezzo or inter-being. It can, however, also metamorphose into a restructured, paranoiac organization, as happens to our destructive crowd around Jack's leadership in *Lord of the Flies*. Or, going even further, the mass can turn into an instrument of self-destruction—of spite.<sup>36</sup>

### Spite

After breaking away from the group, Jack and his hunters quickly realize that they need fire to be able to cook their hunting prey; they

therefore attack Ralph's group to steal Piggy's glasses so that they can make fire. When Ralph's small group loses its major technological support, it is left with no means of survival, and Piggy, completely dependent on his specs, is especially devastated. It is cold, they cannot make a fire, and even worse there is no signal fire; hence, no hope anymore. At this point we get an ideologically well-heeled comment from a crying Piggy: "We did everything just the way grown-ups would have. But why did it not work? Why?"

In desperation, Ralph and Piggy feel that their only option left is to go to Jack's group and "talk" them back to reason. But Jack's group, now totally indifferent to the signal fire, violently attacks them. Piggy starts crying again and, clinging to the conch, makes an effort to make others listen by shouting as loudly as he can: "Which is better—to have rules and agree, or to hunt and kill? . . . Which is better, law and rescue, or hunting and breaking things up?"<sup>37</sup> Exactly at this point, a big rock is rolled down the hill by Roger, the most sadistic character in the film, killing Piggy, the most rational person of the story, on the spot. At the same time it shatters the conch. The last signs of democracy thus disappear, and Ralph takes refuge in the jungle. Jack's boys hunt him in the same way as they hunt pigs. Hiding/dwelling now in the "jungle," the proper place of homo sacer, Ralph loses all hope. To smoke him out, Jack's group sets the whole forest on fire. And fire, initially the symbol of hope and contact with the outer world, turns into a symbol of lack of hope and a paranoid closure. Fire and the crowd coincide:

Of all means of destruction the most impressive is fire. It can be seen from far off and it attracts ever more people. It destroys irrevocably; nothing after a fire is as it was before. A crowd setting fire to something feels irresistible; so long as the fire spreads, everyone will join it and everything hostile will be destroyed. After the destruction, crowd and fire die away.<sup>38</sup>

It is strange to observe how strongly for the person struggling with it the crowd assumes the character of fire. . . . The manner in which fire spreads and gradually works its way round a person until he is entirely surrounded by it is very similar to the crowd threatening him on all sides.<sup>39</sup>

But to see the significance of this scene, we need to look at it from the point of view of Jack's group as well. Is the forest they set alight not the same forest that feeds them? Are they not, in their attack on Ralph, also harming themselves? Spite, willingness to destroy others at one's own expense, is the keyword to understanding the crowd behavior here. As Le Bon formulates it most clearly, self-interest is "very rarely a powerful motive force with crowds."<sup>40</sup> Regardless of how heroic or how cowardly the crowd

behaves, “even the interest of self-preservation, will not dominate them.”<sup>41</sup> The crowd will readily sacrifice itself, desire its own death, for the death of its other. *Lord of the Flies* is, more than anything else, an allegory of spite—an allegory of a society that is ready to destroy itself not only through environmental catastrophes and other manufactured risks but also through a “war against the evil.” Let us at this point dwell on the precise character of evil depicted in the film.

When the two boys (Sam and Eric) mistake the twisted body of the dead parachutist for the beast, they rush back to the group to tell what they have seen. Everybody is horrified and terrified, and an emergency meeting is called. The boys organize an armed expedition to search for the beast. In their search, they discover a thin pathway leading to a hill with small caves. At the summit, Jack “sees” the monster and calls Ralph and Roger, who also climb up to have a look at the monster, a big, dark form that makes the sound of flipping in the wind. Terrified, the three boys run down the mountain to join the group. Jack’s “discovery” of the beast is what gives legitimacy to his war against the evil; hence, the significance of the nonexistent beast.

*Lord of the Flies* depicts a war on an evil (that does not exist). The evil in the film is a virtual player, reminiscent of the devil in the Middle Ages, which, even though it did not exist, was a significant dispositif of governance. In this regard Jack uses the “beast” in the same way as Stalin demonized Trotsky to legitimize his despotism or as Bush makes use of Bin Laden to justify the emerging control society. Significantly in this context, the first victim in the film is Simon, who symbolizes ethics in the film. Why?

In the film there emerge two contrasting views on ethics. First, in their war against the “beast,” the boys reduce ethics to a conformist rule-set, to a supra-individual social codex. As such, ethics only means following the rules of the “game,” obedience to the law.<sup>42</sup> Hence, when the “society” or “civilization” loses its grip on the boys, their “ethics” also immediately disappears. Simon, on the other hand, represents another take on ethics: Instead of reducing ethics to the passive observance of a rule-set on the basis of heteronomous definitions of what is good or evil, he faces the evil in the eye and makes choices as an active, autonomous moral actor. In Simon, ethics remains an impulse, and he is ethical not because of but rather in spite of the society surrounding him. For him, “morality comes not as a secondary layer, above an abstract reflection on the totality and its dangers; morality has an independent and preliminary range. First philosophy is ethics.”<sup>43</sup>

No wonder that it is Simon who climbs to the cave on top of the mountain (pilgrimage?) to find the truth. And most importantly,

throughout the film he is the only figure who manages to remain outside the power struggle between Ralph and Jack. He is a borderline figure directly placed between the actual and the virtual, between society and ethics: Thus, especially in the book, he is the only figure who can communicate with the beast. In a sense, with the figure of Simon the island comes to look like Deleuze's two-floor "baroque house," where the folds of the soul (the virtual) occupy the dark upstairs space (the unconscious), and the sensible matter (the actual) dwells in the ground floor with its doors and windows to the outside world. The most interesting place in this house is of course the stairs, the link between the virtual and the actual, which is also the space of the "event" (virtualization and actualization), without the virtual ever becoming fully actualized.<sup>44</sup> On this account, Simon's climb to the mountain cave is a truly "insignificant" event with significant consequences. Thus, as the crowd is increasingly manipulated by fear of the beast, Simon can see that the beast is their own creation: "What I mean is . . . maybe it's only us."<sup>45</sup>

The evil is us. The war against the evil is not a matter of opposing others but of confronting ourselves, our own desire. In this sense, *Lord of the Flies* is a story of fascism in us all. Thus in the famous preface he wrote for a "book of ethics," Michel Foucault claimed that the "major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism. . . . And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini . . . but also the fascism in us that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us."<sup>46</sup> Which is also the reason why Simon hears the following from the "Lord of the Flies":

Fancy thinking the Beast was something you could hunt and kill!  
 . . . You knew, didn't you? I am part of you? Close, close, close!  
 I'm the reason why it's no go? Why things are what they are?<sup>47</sup>

It is ironic in this respect that the boys in *Lord of the Flies* are people who have escaped Hitler's fascism (they are evacuated in World War II) but are caught up in their own. The "beast" in the film is nothing other than the unconscious desire for power that seduces the boys into doing evil things, into having "fun." Simon is the only exception; this desire affects all the other boys, including Ralph. "Ralph too was fighting to get near, to get a handful of that brown, vulnerable flesh. The desire to squeeze and hurt was overmastering";<sup>48</sup> he, too, is exhilarated for the taste of the chase and gets caught up in his own desire for power. However, he is troubled about this, and thus, "just a game," he says "uneasily."<sup>49</sup> In a sense, then, the evil exists as a virtual entity, as the social unconscious.

Thus the more the boys “see” the beast, the more evil their actions become: It is the paradox of evil. How does the evil materialize, then, in the film?

First, evil appears as banal in Arendt’s sense. Thus, at the beginning of the film the boys are startlingly normal. It is basically a routine rule-following that turns them into evil. As long as they can hide behind the crowd, they can escape conscience. Thus, when Ralph and Piggy try to speak to the twins about the lynching of Simon, they look embarrassed but can say only: “We were tired. We left early.” The truth, however, is that they participated in the event as though it were something commonplace. In the anonymity of the crowd “the sentiment of responsibility which always controls individuals disappears entirely.”<sup>50</sup> What is interesting here is that the twins are in no way pathological: their “banality” pertains to their following the group, the law of fun, and doing so “blindly”; that is, without ethical reflection.<sup>51</sup> Banality in this sense relates to the indifference of the crowd. And herein lies the crucial function of the mask in the film as a symbol of moral indifference and the suspension of sociality. Indeed, every time there is a visible reaction (“politics”) against Roger’s and Jack’s sadistic acts (“suspension” of politics, or the state of exception), they are successfully pacified; it is only when the majority start to show signs of indifference, only when Jack’s and Roger’s acts cease to be *seen* as being morally relevant, that evil takes root on the island with increasing heat. Under Jack’s leadership, the boys are now “protected” from the terror of the “beast,” but the emerging question is who is going to save the silent collaborators from themselves. After all, for evil to occur you don’t need evil people.

Second, evil is rational in the sense that the role of technology (spears, spears, fire) and the organization of the hunters (army) are decisive to the scale of destruction in the film. There are two kinds of objects in interplay in the film: technological objects and fetish objects (the knife and the eye glasses, on the one hand, and the conch, on the other), and it is hard to imagine the events unfolding in the same way without these objects. The most technologically minded person (and thus the most indispensable person to Ralph) is Piggy. In one scene he refers to Simon’s lynching as an accident: “No, they are not as bad as that. It was an accident.”<sup>52</sup> Piggy’s evil is banal in Arendt’s sense, but for Jack and Roger, who primarily engage with spear production in the film, the evil is also rational. It is, after all, the spears that threaten democratic politics on the island, which presupposes a collective interest in the “good society” and a collective responsibility for their “rescue.”

Third, evil is radical. It targets the very humanity of the human being, reducing it to an animal, or a homo sacer, which is why it is



radical.<sup>53</sup> Such evil is hard to grasp. The philosophical tradition and Christianity have always understood evil as being determined by a lack, as a secondary phenomenon that can be eliminated.<sup>54</sup> *Lord of the Flies*, in contrast, expresses an explicitly evil will that cannot be understood as anything else. In this sense *Lord of the Flies* breaks with every utilitarian doctrine and with the idea that every human being has an inherent value. The fire, or the paradise island turned hell, is the symbol of this radical evil.

Apropos of the metaphor of fire in the film, it is striking to remember that the Nazis increased the speed of the extermination of Jews when they started to lose the war and thereby wasted decisive resources that could have been employed in the war. It was, in other words, as if spite mattered more than anything else. We see the radical evil in *Lord of the Flies* in the gesture of desubjectifying or abandoning. It is important in this context to reconsider Simon's death, which is exactly not a sacrificial death, which would have made him a Christ-like religious figure. Instead, he is a homo sacer, who is not killed for his beliefs (sacrificed) but abandoned, reduced to an animal. It is telling in this respect that Jack's group "mistakes" Simon for the "beast" just before the lynching.

Is Roger or Jack an egotist? Hardly so. "An evil person is not an egotist" because a true egotist would take care of himself.<sup>55</sup> What we have in the final scene, the scene of spiteful fire, is not a lynching mob whose mimetic desire, whose envy and egotism, establishes the society. Rather, the opposite is the case: In this case, the mimetic desire does not, as envisaged by Girard, establish the society but destroys it. Here everybody, and not only the scapegoat, is threatened with destruction, with the war of all against all. Spite works regardless of the desire for self-preservation.

Paradoxically, the spiteful fire at the end of *Lord of the Flies* successfully summons a ship to the island. It does what the signal fire could not and saves the boys from themselves. As a whole this ambivalence, which is also the ambivalence of the crowd, is at the heart of the film. Thus, fire has, on the one hand, civilizing functions, as is the case with cooking. After all, the signal fire is the boys' most important link with civilization. On the other hand, fire works to the opposite ends, animalizing the boys and awakening their primitive instincts and spiteful desires. The two-in-one nature of fire and the crowd moves it "beyond good and evil." In this sense the fire/crowd resembles the Latin *pharmakon*, poison and remedy at the same time.

What is crucial here, however, is that in the face of such ambivalence regarding the crowd, merely tolerance for the other is not enough to establish a political ground. What Ralph and Piggy lack is not respect for the other but the capacity for antagonism, to be able to have conflicts with the other. What they lack is, in other

words, not merely respect but what William Connolly calls “agonistic respect,” a concept that enables him to combine tolerance with the possibility of conflict and dispute.<sup>56</sup> Agonistic respect is, in a sense, tolerance in conflict or conflict in tolerance, which is something one has to fight for. Agonistic respect must be created, for it is not rooted in a habitus, in language, or in any other fundament. It is a question of grounding the political itself. But then again, ambivalence thrives in agonistic respect as a political gesture as well. That is, it can easily turn into pure conflictuality, fundamentalism.

While hiding in the jungle, Ralph stumbles across the Lord of the Flies, the dead pig’s head, and smashes it, a revengeful act that resembles the destruction of the conch. Significantly, this event is omitted in the film, which is also why we are left with only a nostalgic longing for an ethics of dialogue as the way out. Democracy is great, so the film tells us, but it is also impotent. It lacks mobilizing power and the capacity for radical acts. Both Piggy, the intellectual, and Ralph, the democrat, lack this ability—except in this incident, where Ralph dares to look evil in the eye. The moment for a radical act is however surpassed: after Ralph has become the new enemy, no one needs the totem animal any more. Thus, Ralph’s act does not amount to more than an empty gesture. But still we should not exclude the possibility of such acts; they have a time and a moment. And radical they are in aiming for the destruction of our most cherished object. If evil is “in us,” then an ethical act must be an act of “self destruction,” an act that undermines what make us a “we.”

Significantly in this respect, Benjamin was the first to divide Schmitt’s concept of exception, producing a remainder of it. For Schmitt, exception is a limit concept that presupposes a “normal” situation as its background. The state of exception aims at the preservation of this normality with extraordinary means. In other words, Schmitt’s project is to legitimize the state of exception, or to normalize what is exceptional. Along similar lines, we could argue that the state of exception on the island is reactionary, or, to phrase it differently, that violence is rational. The generalized exception, the festival, is Jack’s way of strengthening his power. In this, everything is made fluid; all hierarchies are reversed. But one thing remains constant: Jack, the leader.

To be sure, Benjamin was in many ways inspired by Schmitt’s methodological extremism, even though his own project was opposed to Schmitt’s. Whereas Schmitt wanted to legitimize Nazi power, Benjamin criticized it. Schmitt was conservative, Benjamin revolutionary. Indeed, this tension found its best expression in their understanding of sovereignty. Hence to Schmitt’s exception Benjamin opposed the suspension of suspension, a “real” excep-

tion, or, better, an exception to exception itself. What is decisive here is the notion that, when generalized, exception loses its status as a limit of normality. The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism.<sup>57</sup>

Whereas in Schmitt exception is the political kernel of the law, it becomes divine justice in Benjamin. And then we are confronted with the difference between two exceptions: Schmitt’s exception is nothing else than an attempt at avoiding the “real” exception, the revolution, or divine justice. Benjamin’s exception, in stark contrast, suspends the relationality between the law and its suspension in “a zone of anomy dominated by pure violence with no legal cover.”<sup>58</sup> The question of this real exception is the one that cannot be posed today without immediately facing the accusation of being a nihilist or a fundamentalist. And why is it so? To end with an answer to this question, let us focus on the final scene.

### Speechless

The whole jungle is on fire. Ralph is being hunted. He is hopeless, without being able to find a shelter from violence. Running frenetically, he makes his way to the beach, but collapses there. Worn out, breathless, he is about to surrender to his predators, who are not far behind him. But miraculously at this point, he notices a naval officer looking at him. Obviously a ship has seen the fire. He is saved by the fire, which was intended to destroy him. Shortly after, the other boys arrive with their painted bodies and sharpened spears. They are startled when they see the officer. The officer, in turn, looks puzzled. With this scene, the film ends. But, unforgivably in our view, it omits an essential dialogue from the book. In the book, when the naval officer sees the naked boys with masks and weapons, he thinks they are playing, having “fun and games,” and crucially (mis)interprets the situation as a “Jolly good show. Like the Coral Island.”<sup>59</sup>

*Coral Island* is R. M. Ballantyne’s children’s novel from the nineteenth century in which three British boys on a tropical island successfully “defend” civilization against pirates, cannibals, and wild animals. In other words, it is a naïve version of *Lord of the Flies*. Which makes the dialogue essential, also because it is here that the first living “adult” figure appears. Crucially, however, this figure turns out to be an infantilized adult, for whom war is a game, “like

the Coral Island.” Further, the boys in the film are “rescued” by soldiers only to move to another war, to a more general state of exception. In a sense, therefore, the world the film depicts is a world with no outside. The “outside” is as violent, and as infantilized, as the boys’ island.

Indeed, by omitting this crucial point, the film creates the illusion that outside the island things are “normal”—that outside there is civilization. The irony, however, is that the boys are, in the first place, on the island because of a war. They are, so to speak, waging a war within a bigger war. This “official” war of the “adults” is not less but—with more technology, bigger crowds, and more powerful sadists—more violent than everything that happens on the island. The two worlds are continuous.<sup>60</sup>

Herein lies the significance of the fact that the film is about boys. Why boys? Perhaps because Golding thought that boys, as half-formed beings, could be perfect symbols of the central conflict between civilization and barbarism. Thus the boys in the film occupy a grey zone of indistinction between society and nature. But still, why does the only man in the film appear like a boy? Indeed, *Lord of the Flies* is an allegory of infantilization.

After all, the “childhood” of society is the state of nature. And the “nature” that comes *after* “society” is the state of exception, a condition in which the “citizen” is reduced to a member of a crowd. At a first approximation, therefore, infantilization is about regressive evolution: a movement not from the child to the adult but from the adult to the child, from the human to the orangutan, from society, *bios*, to the nature, *zoe*. The state of exception is a world in which orangutan stems from human beings. And, in a sense, the becoming orangutan of man is what explains the increasing infantilization of the contemporary culture, especially in the context of consumption and the war against terror.

It is well known that in premodern times the “child” did not exist; that is, did not constitute a different being. Hence in paintings, for example, the children were depicted as grown-ups, only smaller in size, as child-men.<sup>61</sup> First in modernity childhood took the form of an exceptional period in individual chronology, and the child emerged as a subject to be normalized and disciplined: the child-man is, per definition, desocialized. Therefore, some of the most significant panoptic institutions of modernity, the nursery and the school, for instance, mark the difference between the child and the man. To be a proper “man” one should first be a proper “child”; that is, disciplined and normalized in a site of confinement. And then one could move forward to other institutions, to factories, universities, marriages, and finally to the elderly care,

living a life on the move “from one closed site to another, each with its own laws,” each marked by an inside-outside divide.<sup>62</sup> This is, however, changing in today’s “control societies,” whose main symptom is the breaking down of panoptic boundaries:

In disciplinary societies you were always starting all over again (as you went from school to barracks, from barracks to factory), while in control societies you never finish anything—business, training, and military service being coexisting metastable states of a single modulation, a sort of universal transmutation.<sup>63</sup>

Perhaps today the discipline specific to the nursery is also moving beyond the panoptic walls with the result that the man-child is, again, everywhere, in every domain. That one’s childhood “never finishes” means that the nursery extends itself to the whole society—that, in a sense, the exception becomes the rule. In this sense, infantilization is the “end of the outside,” of the divide between the child and the adult. In the “smooth” biographic space that emerges, the distinction between the child and the adult can be created only at a fantasy level, hiding the fact that the outside of the nursery is also a nursery: the infantilized world of the man-child.

Otherwise, outside this fantasy frame, the child (the exception) and the adult (the rule) are indistinguishable, and thus the imperatives that govern adult life are the same as those that govern the nursery: play, learning, protection. In the “new spirit of capitalism” it is imperative to play; that is, to be nomadic, experimenting, and inspired.<sup>64</sup> Ours is a society in which play is consumption, consumption is play. Ideally, the consumer is a child, who shops impulsively, whose desire is to be aroused, channeled, and manipulated. Second, we live in a knowledge-based society—one in which we “never finish” learning. “Continuous assessment” is thus indispensable to it.<sup>65</sup> And finally, ours is a society of fear, of scaremongering, in which we are continually told that we need to be protected. For security, we are advised to sacrifice even democracy. After all, *in-fant* means speechless. The children need no agora; if they had one, they would destroy it anyway, as they did the conch in *Lord of the Flies*.

If the young human feels intense grief, anger, or other emotion, he is not able to contain it, and he is forced into “acting out.” A frustrated child is unable to internalize the discomfort or to release it by verbal expression. He rids himself of this unbearable tension by an act, like kicking against the floor. . . . Crying, head-banging, screaming, or other forms of temper tantrums are a child’s way of obtaining a denied wish.<sup>66</sup>

It is no wonder that political infantilization today comes with a rigid polarization between good and bad (“you are either with us or against us”), which reduces reality to fairy stories, or, rather, to a “comedy of (t)errors”: no weapons of mass destruction are found; Bin Laden is not caught; Afghanistan seems to be more deserted than ever; democracy has not arrived in Iraq, and so on. But everything goes on and on. In this, the “audience” is treated like an infantilized crowd.

It is striking, in this respect, to observe the parallel between the infantilized subject of security and the frightened subject of terror, the hostage. The hostage is an anonymous figure, a naked, formless body, which is absolutely convertible: anybody and everybody can be a hostage.<sup>67</sup> Likewise, the politics of security redefines the citizen as a fearful subject, like a child, to be protected. Anybody and everybody must be protected. Consequently, both the enemy and the friend are desubjectified; while the “enemy” is reduced to an illegal combatant or a fundamentalist, the “friend,” the subject of security, becomes infantilized.

It is against this background that *Lord of the Flies* is an allegory of a biopolitical, or, better, a postpolitical society that elevates “security” to its most sacred principle of organization in the form of a permanent state of exception and tries to combine it with consumerism (so that we need security to be able to consume and need to consume to be able to feel secure). After all, violence in *Lord of the Flies* was just an exceptional circumstance: The boys were “just playing!” The crucial question is whether this is a valid answer in today’s society: Is the exception just an exception or is it generalized? Who then today counts as evil, as the Lord of the Flies? And how is evil to be fought?

Control society is a society in which fear/terror and businesses, like unidentical twins, work together through a disjunctive synthesis to form a single dispositif. It is, therefore, no coincidence that spite as a postpolitical strategy reemerges in today’s society. Hence, with reference to the recent protests/fires in the French suburbs, Slavoj Žižek asks:

Where is the celebrated freedom of choice, when the only choice is the one between playing by the rules and (self-)destructive violence, a violence which is almost exclusively directed against one’s own—the cars burned and the schools torched were not from rich neighborhoods, but were part of the hard-won acquisitions of the very strata from which protestors originate.<sup>68</sup>

In the contemporary, postpolitical society, the “agora” is not functioning as it is supposed to be: Violence cannot be translated

into a political language and, thus, it can only assume the form of an obscene, irrational outburst. Such impotent violence is self-sacrificial, and loudly so. It is spite: *Lord of the Flies* as savior.

### Notes

Stefan George, quoted in the epigraph, is one of the most important poets of the early twentieth century, and became a source of inspiration for Fascist circles in Germany. The poem quoted is from his 1907 work *The Antichrist*. See Justin Cartwright, "Prophet of Doom," *Guardian*, Jan. 13, 2006.

1. William Golding, *Lord of the Flies* (London: Faber & Faber, 1954). The book has been filmed twice, in 1963 by Peter Brook and in 1990 by Harry Hook.

2. Gilles Deleuze, "Desert Islands," in Gilles Deleuze, *Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953–1974* (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), pp. 9–14; the quotation is from p. 12.

3. Golding, note 1, p. 33.

4. Ibid., p. 74.

5. Ibid., p. 75.

6. Ibid., p. 79.

7. Ibid., p. 81.

8. Piggy, *ibid.*, p. 37.

9. Georges Bataille, *The Accursed Share*, vols. 2, 3 (New York: Zone Books, 1993), p. 124.

10. Georges Bataille, *Eroticism* (London: Penguin, 2001), pp. 17–18.

11. See Elias Canetti, *Crowds and Power* (London: Phoenix, 1962), p. 15.

12. Bataille, note 9, p. 89.

13. Ibid., p. 129.

14. Bataille, note 10, p. 36.

15. Ibid., p. 63.

16. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).

17. Bataille, note 9, p. 90.

18. Bataille, note 10, p. 68.

19. Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (New York: Dover, 2002), p. 2.

20. Ibid., pp. 14, 7.

21. Golding, note 1, p. 88.

22. Canetti, note 11, p. 107.

23. See *ibid.*, p. 114.

24. Golding, note 1, p. 126.

25. Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 141.

26. See Canetti, note 11, pp. 23, 42, 46.

27. See Freud, note 25, pp. 141–146.

28. Golding, note 1, p. 158.

29. Slavoj Žižek, "Some Politically Incorrect Reflections on Violence and Related Matters": [www.lacan.com/zizfrance](http://www.lacan.com/zizfrance), 2005.

30. Golding, note 1, p. 103.

31. René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred* (London: Continuum, 1977), p. 8.

32. Canetti, note 11, p. 117.

33. Giorgio Agamben, *Means Without End: Notes on Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).



34. Wolfgang Palaver, "A Girardian Reading of Schmitts' Political Theology," *Telos* 94 (1992): 43–68.
35. Michel Maffesoli, *The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in Mass Society* (London: Sage, 1996), p. 64.
36. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1987), pp. 229–230.
37. Golding, note 1, p. 200.
38. Canetti, note 11, p. 20.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
40. Le Bon, note 19, p. 28.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
42. Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 8.
43. Emmanuel Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), p. 77.
44. See Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Helene Frichot, "Stealing into Deleuze's Baroque House," in Ian Buchanan and Gregg Lambert, *Deleuze and Space* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp. 61–79.
45. Golding, note 1, pp. 95–96.
46. Michel Foucault, preface to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism, and Schizophrenia*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. xi–xiv; the quote is from p. xiii.
47. Golding, note 1, p. 158.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
50. Le Bon, note 19, p. 6.
51. Hannah Arendt, *The Life of Mind* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1978).
52. Golding, note 1, p. 204.
53. See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1973).
54. *Ibid.*, p. 459.
55. Zizek, note 29.
56. William E. Connolly, *Pluralism* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005).
57. Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (London: Fontana Press, 1992).
58. Giorgio Agamben, "The State of Exception," *Lettre Internationale* 1 (2003): 31–33.
59. Golding, note 1, pp. 223–224.
60. See Deleuze, note 2, p. 13.
61. See Philippe Aries, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (New York: Vintage, 1962).
62. Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 177.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
64. See Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, *Le Nouvel Esprit du Capitalisme* (Paris: Gallimard, 1999).
65. Deleuze, note 62, p. 179.
66. David Jonas and Doris Klein, *Man-Child: A Study of the Infantilization of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 162.
67. Jean Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies* (Paris: Semiotext(e)/Pluto, 1990), pp. 34–35.
68. Zizek, note 29.